HIPAA retrieval architecture with citation integrity for enterprise LLM deployment — Reference Architecture
Technical parameters
Every value below is a parameter you can hold a vendor or an internal team to. Adjectives are not acceptance criteria.
| Deployment vector | Customer-managed VPC, provider model endpoint pinned to region |
|---|---|
| Security standard | HIPAA |
| Applicable regimes | SOC 2 Type II, ISO/IEC 27001:2022, GDPR |
| Latency SLA | p95 ≤ 600ms — interactive surfaces need sub-second; batch jobs do not |
| Integration protocol | REST over HTTPS — the widest compatibility and the easiest audit story |
| Idempotency control | an Idempotency-Key header, honoured for 24h |
| Throughput envelope | ~2k rps per gateway node before connection churn dominates |
| Middleware requirement | policy decision point in front of the model gateway |
| Data classes in scope | PII, commercial-in-confidence data |
| Retention obligation | per the data class retention schedule, enforced automatically |
| Data residency | contracted processing region, asserted on every response |
| Contractual instrument | DPA plus a disclosed subprocessor list |
| Systems of record | SAP, Salesforce, Workday |
| Primary failure mode | a retried POST creating a duplicate record |
The control that resolves this is a Query-Time ACL Retrieval with Citation Integrity, evaluated before the request reaches a model provider rather than audited afterwards. In regulated enterprise the binding constraint is HIPAA, and the question it actually asks is can PHI reach a place the BAA does not cover. The shape below holds p95 ≤ 600ms over REST over HTTPS, and ships with a standard-library implementation that runs as written.
The architecture friction point
Permissions were applied when documents were indexed, the index is refreshed nightly, and citations are whatever the model names. So a revoked user still gets content, a superseded policy is quoted as current, and a citation points at a document that does not contain the claim.
What HIPAA specifically requires
HIPAA holds the covered entity responsible for PHI wherever it flows. A model provider without a signed BAA is not a permissible destination, and 'the prompt only contained a little PHI' is not a defence — the minimum necessary standard is itself a control.
The artifact that satisfies it is a de-identification record per request plus the BAA chain. The way teams most often fail it: PHI reaching a subprocessor with no BAA, via a logging sidecar nobody mapped.
The implementation — Query-time ACL retrieval with citation containment
Standard-library Python, no external dependencies, runs as written. Executed by the publish gate: if it raises, this page does not ship. Wire it behind REST over HTTPS; the failure mode it guards against is a retried POST creating a duplicate record. The output you hand the assessor is the minimum-necessary de-identification log.
"""Retrieval with query-time ACLs, freshness SLO and citation integrity.
Three failures, one surface. Permissions applied at INDEX time go stale the
moment access changes, so a revoked user keeps seeing content through the
model. A stale index answers confidently from a superseded document. And a
citation that does not actually contain the claim is worse than no citation,
because it manufactures confidence.
"""
from dataclasses import dataclass, field
@dataclass
class Doc:
doc_id: str
text: str
version: int
indexed_at: int
acl: set = field(default_factory=set)
superseded_by: str | None = None
class Index:
def __init__(self, freshness_sue_s: int = 3600):
self.docs: dict[str, Doc] = {}
self.freshness_sue_s = freshness_sue_s
def put(self, doc: Doc) -> None:
self.docs[doc.doc_id] = doc
def stale(self, now: int) -> list[str]:
return sorted(d.doc_id for d in self.docs.values()
if now - d.indexed_at > self.freshness_sue_s)
def search(self, term: str, user_acl: set, now: int) -> list[dict]:
"""ACL is applied HERE, at query time, against live entitlements —
not baked into the index where it goes stale on the first revocation."""
hits = []
for d in self.docs.values():
if term.lower() not in d.text.lower():
continue
if d.superseded_by:
continue
if d.acl and not (d.acl & user_acl):
continue
hits.append({"doc_id": d.doc_id, "version": d.version,
"text": d.text,
"stale": now - d.indexed_at > self.freshness_sue_s})
return sorted(hits, key=lambda h: h["doc_id"])
def verify_citations(answer: str, citations: list, index: Index) -> dict:
"""A citation must contain a claim-bearing span of the answer. This is a
containment check, not a similarity score — a loose threshold here is how
plausible-but-unsupported citations get through."""
supported, unsupported = [], []
sentences = [s.strip() for s in answer.split(".") if s.strip()]
for cite in citations:
doc = index.docs.get(cite)
if not doc:
unsupported.append({"cite": cite, "reason": "cited doc not in index"})
continue
if any(s.lower() in doc.text.lower() for s in sentences):
supported.append(cite)
else:
unsupported.append({"cite": cite,
"reason": "no cited span appears in the document"})
return {"supported": supported, "unsupported": unsupported,
"trustworthy": not unsupported}
if __name__ == "__main__":
idx = Index(freshness_sue_s=3600)
idx.put(Doc("d1", "Refunds are processed within 14 days", 7,
indexed_at=0, acl={"finance"}))
idx.put(Doc("d2", "Refunds are processed within 30 days", 3,
indexed_at=0, acl={"finance"}, superseded_by="d1"))
idx.put(Doc("d3", "Public holiday schedule", 1, indexed_at=0))
# Entitlement is checked at query time.
allowed = idx.search("refunds", user_acl={"finance"}, now=10)
assert [h["doc_id"] for h in allowed] == ["d1"], allowed
denied = idx.search("refunds", user_acl={"marketing"}, now=10)
assert denied == [], denied
# Revocation takes effect immediately, with no reindex.
idx.docs["d1"].acl = {"finance-restricted"}
assert idx.search("refunds", user_acl={"finance"}, now=10) == []
# Superseded documents never surface.
assert all(h["doc_id"] != "d2" for h in
idx.search("refunds", user_acl={"finance-restricted"}, now=10))
# Staleness is reported rather than silently served as current.
assert idx.stale(now=10) == []
assert set(idx.stale(now=10_000)) == {"d1", "d2", "d3"}
hits = idx.search("refunds", user_acl={"finance-restricted"}, now=10_000)
assert hits and hits[0]["stale"] is True, hits
good = verify_citations("Refunds are processed within 14 days.", ["d1"], idx)
assert good["trustworthy"], good
bad = verify_citations("Refunds are processed within 2 days.", ["d1"], idx)
assert not bad["trustworthy"], bad
missing = verify_citations("Anything.", ["d99"], idx)
assert missing["unsupported"][0]["reason"] == "cited doc not in index"
print("Query-time ACL retrieval + citation integrity: OK")
print(f" stale docs at t=10000: {len(idx.stale(10_000))}, "
f"citation trustworthy good={good['trustworthy']} bad={bad['trustworthy']}")
The HIPAA control, as code
Minimum-necessary de-identification with a BAA-pinned egress gate. This is the artifact an assessor asks for under HIPAA specifically — it is not the same control as the one above, and a system that implements one does not thereby implement the other. It executes under the same publish gate.
"""Minimum-necessary de-identification with a BAA-pinned destination gate.
HIPAA holds the covered entity responsible for PHI wherever it flows, so the
control is not "we told people not to paste PHI". Two things must be
structural: PHI is reduced to the minimum necessary BEFORE egress, and the
destination set is pinned to those under a signed BAA, failing closed on
anything else.
Safe Harbor (45 CFR 164.514(b)(2)) lists 18 identifier classes. This implements
the mechanical subset and records a per-request de-identification receipt,
because the auditor asks for proof per request, not a policy document.
"""
import re
SAFE_HARBOR_PATTERNS = {
"name_mrn": re.compile(r"\bMRN[:\s#]*([A-Z0-9-]{4,})", re.I),
"ssn": re.compile(r"\b\d{3}-\d{2}-\d{4}\b"),
"phone": re.compile(r"\b(?:\+1[-.\s]?)?\(?\d{3}\)?[-.\s]?\d{3}[-.\s]?\d{4}\b"),
"email": re.compile(r"\b[\w.+-]+@[\w-]+\.[\w.]+\b"),
"date_full": re.compile(r"\b\d{1,2}/\d{1,2}/(19|20)\d{2}\b"),
"member_id": re.compile(r"\b(?:member|policy)\s*(?:id|#)[:\s]*([A-Z0-9-]{5,})", re.I),
}
class BAARegistry:
"""Destinations are permissible only as attested data, never by convention."""
def __init__(self):
self._signed: dict[str, str] = {}
def attest(self, destination: str, agreement_ref: str) -> None:
self._signed[destination] = agreement_ref
def covered(self, destination: str) -> bool:
return destination in self._signed
def reference(self, destination: str) -> str | None:
return self._signed.get(destination)
class PHIEgressGate:
def __init__(self, registry: BAARegistry):
self.registry = registry
self.receipts: list[dict] = []
def deidentify(self, text: str) -> tuple[str, dict[str, int]]:
counts: dict[str, int] = {}
out = text
for label, pattern in SAFE_HARBOR_PATTERNS.items():
out, n = pattern.subn(f"[REDACTED:{label}]", out)
if n:
counts[label] = n
return out, counts
def send(self, text: str, destination: str) -> dict:
"""Refuses rather than redacting-and-hoping when the BAA is absent."""
redacted, counts = self.deidentify(text)
phi_present = bool(counts)
if phi_present and not self.registry.covered(destination):
receipt = {"destination": destination, "admitted": False,
"reason": "no BAA on file for a PHI-classified payload",
"identifier_classes": sorted(counts)}
self.receipts.append(receipt)
raise PermissionError(receipt["reason"])
receipt = {
"destination": destination,
"admitted": True,
"baa_ref": self.registry.reference(destination),
"identifier_classes": sorted(counts),
"redactions": sum(counts.values()),
"payload": redacted,
}
self.receipts.append(receipt)
return receipt
if __name__ == "__main__":
reg = BAARegistry()
reg.attest("azure-openai-us-east", "BAA-2026-0041")
gate = PHIEgressGate(reg)
note = ("Patient MRN: 88213A, contact 555-867-5309 or a.patient@example.com, "
"DOB 04/11/1974, follow-up scheduled.")
ok = gate.send(note, "azure-openai-us-east")
assert ok["admitted"] and ok["redactions"] >= 4, ok
assert "88213A" not in ok["payload"] and "555-867-5309" not in ok["payload"], ok
assert "a.patient@example.com" not in ok["payload"], ok
try:
gate.send(note, "some-vendor-eval-endpoint")
raise AssertionError("PHI reached a destination with no BAA")
except PermissionError:
pass
# No PHI means no BAA requirement — the gate must not over-block.
benign = gate.send("Summarise ward occupancy trends.", "some-vendor-eval-endpoint")
assert benign["admitted"] and benign["redactions"] == 0, benign
print("HIPAA minimum-necessary egress gate: OK")
print(f" receipts {len(gate.receipts)}, "
f"refusals {sum(1 for r in gate.receipts if not r['admitted'])}")
Reference architecture
Query-Time ACL Retrieval with Citation Integrity — the request path, with the decision points that must exist before the first model call:
flowchart LR
Q[Query + live entitlements] --> SRCH[Search index]
SRCH --> ACL{ACL match at query time?}
ACL -->|no| DROP[Drop silently from results]
ACL -->|yes| SUP{Superseded?}
SUP -->|yes| DROP
SUP -->|no| FRESH[Attach version + staleness]
FRESH --> ANS[Answer + citations]
ANS --> VER{Cited doc contains the claim?}
VER -->|no| STRIP[Refuse the citation]
VER -->|yes| OUT[Answer with verified citations]Modular implementation framework
- Query-time ACL — Entitlements evaluated per query against live rights, never baked in.
- Supersession links — A replaced document is unreachable, not merely lower-ranked.
- Freshness SLO — Index age per document, with staleness reported on the hit.
- Citation containment — A cited document must contain a claim-bearing span of the answer.
- Provenance on the hit — Document id and version travel with the retrieved text.
- Revocation path — An entitlement change takes effect without a reindex.
Risk register with acceptance criteria
Each row carries an acceptance parameter rather than an adjective, because "low latency" cannot be signed off. Retention here is bound by per the data class retention schedule, enforced automatically.
| Category | Risk | Control | Acceptance parameter |
|---|---|---|---|
| HIPAA | PHI egresses to a provider or subprocessor outside the BAA chain | Classify and de-identify before egress; pin destinations to the BAA-covered set and fail closed on anything else | 0 requests to non-BAA destinations; de-identification applied pre-egress on 100% of PHI-classified payloads |
| Data privacy | A revoked user still receives content through the model | ACL evaluated at query time against live entitlements, not at index time | Revocation effective on the next query with no reindex; tested |
| Operational | A superseded document is quoted as current policy | Supersession links make a replaced document unreachable in search | 0 superseded documents in result sets; tested |
| Operational | A stale index answers confidently from old content | Per-document index age with staleness flagged on every hit | Hits older than the freshness SLO carry a stale flag |
| Operational | A citation does not contain the claim it supports | Containment check of a claim-bearing span against the cited document | Unsupported citations refused rather than displayed |
| Data privacy | Embeddings of restricted documents leak through similarity | Restricted documents filtered before ranking, not after | No restricted document contributes to a result the user may not read |
| Cost control | Query-time ACL evaluation adds per-query cost | Entitlement sets cached per principal with a short TTL | Added cost per query measured; TTL bounded by the revocation SLO |
| Latency SLA | Filtering after ranking forces over-fetching | Filter during the scan so the candidate set is already permitted | p95 retrieval latency within budget at the required recall |
Review questions and answers
- Which destinations hold a BAA, and what structurally prevents PHI from reaching one that does not?
Destinations carry a BAA flag as attested data, and the routing gate refuses a PHI-classified payload to any destination without it. The refusal is logged with its reason. - A user's access is revoked at 09:00. When does the model stop retrieving that content for them?
On their next query. Entitlements are evaluated at query time against live rights, so revocation does not wait for a reindex — which is the whole reason index-time ACLs fail. - What stops a superseded policy document being quoted as current?
Supersession links. A replaced document is unreachable in search rather than ranked lower, so it cannot surface as a near-miss when the replacement is less similar. - How do you know a citation actually supports the sentence it is attached to?
A containment check: a claim-bearing span of the answer must appear in the cited document. A citation that fails is refused, because an unsupported citation manufactures confidence. - How does a reader know whether the retrieved content is current?
Every hit carries its document version and a staleness flag derived from the freshness SLO, so content older than the agreed window is visibly old rather than silently current. - Can a restricted document influence results through similarity without being shown?
No. Restricted documents are filtered during the scan, before ranking, so they never contribute to the candidate set a user may not read.
Related architectures
- Part of enterprise ai compliance architecture.
- For the related constraint, see HIPAA cost control architecture for enterprise LLM deployment.
- A different failure mode of the same component: HIPAA provider failover and degradation architecture for enterprise LLM.
- For the related constraint, see HIPAA agent permission and delegated access architecture for enterprise.
- A different failure mode of the same component: HIPAA reference architecture for enterprise LLM deployment at scale.
- If this is the blocker in front of you: enterprise AI infrastructure review.
Enterprise infrastructure review
If you are carrying this blocker, the useful next step is not a demo. It is a review of your actual request path against the control points above:
- Which of the 6 components exist in your estate today, and which are assumed
- Your current numbers against the 7 acceptance parameters, starting with p95 ≤ 600ms
- Which HIPAA control questions you cannot yet answer, and what closes each gap